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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MILLER FAMILY REAL ESTATE, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
SAIED HAJIZADEH, an individual, and 
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Appellate Case No. 20080365-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
Honorable John Paul Kennedy 
Nick J. Colessides (0696) Larry G. Moore (2305) 
446 South 400 East, # 100 Brent D. Wride (5163) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Gregory S. Roberts (9092) 
Telephone: (801)521 -4441 RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
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Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (2008). 
ISSUE 
The issue in this case is whether, in dismissing the plaintiffs complaint in this 
matter for failing to first seek mediation, the district court correctly ruled that the 
dismissal should be "without prejudice." 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: The district ruled as a matter of law 
pursuant to a motion to dismiss the complaint. Accordingly, the district court's rulings 
are reviewed for correctness. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, the Court views the 
facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Id.; see also, Hobbs v. Labor Comm % 991 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct App. 1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The defendants in this case are Saied Hajizadeh and Exclusive Cars, Inc. 
(collectively "Hajizadeh"). After Hajizadeh refused to close on the sale of certain real 
property ("Property") to Miller Family Real Estate, L.L.C. ("Miller") as required by the 
parties' contract, Miller filed a complaint (the "Complaint") seeking a decree of specific 
performance ordering Hajizadeh to convey the Property to Miller in accordance with the 
written Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") between the parties. 
Hajizadeh moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that Miller, prior to 
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filing the Complaint, failed to send an offer of mediation to Hajizadeh pursuant to 
Section 15 of the REPC. Upon receipt of the Hajizadeh's motion, Miller immediately 
offered mediation in writing, but Hajizadeh declined to mediate. 
Miller believed that because his cause of action was for specific performance, the 
express language of the REPC did not require an offer of mediation prior to filing suit. 
However, Judge Kennedy ruled that Miller could not seek specific performance under the 
REPC without first making an offer of mediation pursuant to Section 15 of the REPC. 
He therefore ordered that the Complaint should be dismissed "without prejudice," thereby 
specifically and expressly allowing Miller to refile the complaint after it had made an 
offer of mediation to Hajizadeh. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Hajizadeh is the owner of certain land and buildings located at 5712 and 
5720 South State Street, Murray, Utah (the "Property"). R. 2. 
2. Hajizadeh offered and listed the Property for sale with a real estate agent, 
advertised the Property for sale, negotiated a purchase price for the sale of the Property 
and then agreed to sell the Property to Miller pursuant to the REPC. Id 
3. The parties agreed to close the sale of the Property on or before April 30, 
2007. Id 
4. Miller caused the entire balance of the purchase price to be wired to the 
escrow account for closing on April 30, 2007. Id. 
5. On April 30, 2007, Hajizadeh refused to close and, via a letter from his 
attorney, informed Miller that he would not close on the sale of the Property as he 
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contracted to do. Hajizadeh has never offered any legal excuse or defense for his refusal 
to close. R. 3. 
6. Miller filed the Complaint on or about May 8, 2007, seeking specific 
performance of the REPC. R. 1. 
7. Counsel for Hajizadeh, without contacting Miller's counsel, requesting 
mediation, or discussing a delay in responding to the Complaint in any way, filed a 
motion to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that an offer of mediation was a condition 
precedent to filing a lawsuit. R. 45. 
8. As stated above, Miller does not believe that an offer of mediation was 
required prior to filing a specific performance action under the express language of 
Section 15 of the REPC. However, upon receipt of Hajizadeh's motion to dismiss the 
Complaint, rather than arguing about the meaning of the language in Section 15, Miller's 
counsel offered in writing to mediate Hajizadeh's breach of the REPC. R. 75. 
9. At a September 6, 2007 hearing on Hajizadeh's motion to dismiss the 
Complaint, Judge Kennedy ruled that Section 15 of the REPC required an offer of 
mediation to be made concurrently with or prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Judge 
Kennedy therefore granted Hajizadeh's motion to dismiss, but he expressly indicated that 
the dismissal was "without prejudice." R. 338 at 22:20-21. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court properly concluded that the Complaint should be dismissed 
"without prejudice." The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that failure to comply 
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with a contractual mediation clause does not result in the case being dismissed with 
prejudice. State v. Ison, 135 P.3d 864 (Utah 2006). 
ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DISMISSAL OF 
MILLER'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE "WITHOUT PREJUDICE.55 
Hajizadeh's contention that the dismissal of Miller's Complaint should have been 
with prejudice is completely without merit. Hajizadeh argues that because Miller failed 
to make an offer of mediation (pursuant to Section 15 of the REPC) within 30 days after 
Miller noted the existence of a dispute, Miller is forever barred from filing suit against 
Hajizadeh. Stated otherwise, Hajizadeh contends that Section 15 of the REPC contains 
the equivalent of a 30-day statute of limitations to offer mediation. This contention is 
completely without merit as it is not supported by the plain language of the REPC nor is 
such supported by the relevant case law concerning invoking alternative dispute 
resolution provisions. 
A. HAJIZADEH'S CONTENTION THAT THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSE 
CONTAINS A 30-DAY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE REPC. 
Section 15 of the REPC provided as follows: 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any 
dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not 
limited to the disposition of the Earnest Money Deposit and the 
breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to 
mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller 
Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Each 
party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. Mediation shall 
take place within 30 days after notice by either party of the 
existence of a dispute or claim. Any agreement signed by the 
parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding. If mediation 
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fails, the procedures applicable and remedies available under this 
Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section shall prohibit the 
Buyer from seeking specific performance by the Seller by filing a 
complaint with the court, serving it on the Seller by means of 
summons or as otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis 
pendens with regard to the action; provided that the Buyer 
permits the Seller to refrain from answering the complaint 
pending mediation. Also the parties may agree in writing to 
waive mediation.1 (Emphasis added.) 
The language that Hajizadeh attempts to rely on to support his 30-Day Statute of 
Limitations contention—i.e., "Mediation shall take place within 30 days after notice by 
either party of the existence of a dispute or claim"—was clearly intended to mean that 
any mediation shall occur within 30 days after one of the parties gives notice to the other 
party of its willingness to mediate the relevant dispute. In other words, this provision 
was intended to prevent the non-requesting party from impeding the requesting party's 
right to file a complaint by simply failing to timely respond to an offer of mediation or 
otherwise stringing out the mediation process. 
Such provision does not mean, as Hajizadeh contends, that a party only has 30 
days to make an offer of mediation after first noticing a potential dispute between the 
parties and that failure to do so forever bars a party from bringing any action to enforce 
the REPC. Such an interpretation would not make sense because it would not allow an 
opportunity for the parties to attempt to resolve their differences informally or for one 
Again, Miller maintains that the next to last sentence of Section 15 allows the Buyer 
(i.e., Miller) to file a complaint for specific performance before making an offer of 
mediation, which Miller attempted to do. {See REPC, § 15 at sentence stating "Nothing 
in this Section shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the Seller 
by filing a complaint with the court.") 
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party to cure the default before the other party was forced to initiate the litigation process. 
Indeed, a 30-Day Statute of Limitations Period would likely violate the open court 
provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees that litigants 
will have their "day in court." Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663, 673 (Utah 
2002). 
The language at issue in Section 15 has nothing to do with whether the REPC is 
valid (which it clearly is), or whether Hajizadeh is in default (it is undisputed that he is), 
it only addresses the sequence in which a party shall exercise its remedies and the speed 
with which a requested mediation must take place. 
B. HAJIZADEH'S CONTENTION THAT THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSE 
CONTAINS A 30-DAY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
RELEVANT CASE LAW. 
Hajizadeh has failed to cite any case law from any jurisdiction where a court 
ordered a dismissal with prejudice on the merits merely because one party failed to 
comply with a contractual mediation clause. Rather, Hajizadeh cites statutes that provide 
for mandatory mediation in certain situations and, thereafter, attempts to analogize the 
REPC dispute resolution clause as a "condition precedent" that relieves Hajizadeh of any 
obligation he had under the REPC and bars any subsequent lawsuit concerning the 
substantive breach. (See Appellant's Brief at 7-9.) A condition precedent, however, 
concerns the parties' fundamental obligations under the contract and not the timing or 
sequencing of any action addressing a party's failure to perform his or her contractual 
obligations. In this case, it is undisputed that Miller performed its material obligations 
under the REPC and Hajizadeh did not. 
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Any failure to comply with a mediation requirement would not excuse Hajizadeh's 
nonperformance and/or forever bar Miller from taking legal action to remedy the same. 
See State v. Ison, 135 P.3d 864 (Utah 2006) (which clearly indicates that failure to 
comply with a contractual mediation clause does not result in the case being dismissed 
"with prejudice.55). In Ison the Utah Supreme Court stated "[a]s a general proposition of 
contract law, a failure to properly invoke a dispute resolution provision will not excuse a 
breach of a substantive contract term." Ison, 135 P.3d at 873 (emphasis added). The 
Utah Supreme Court went on to say that "We are aware of no contract law authority ... to 
support the proposition that a party's failure to pursue an agreed-upon alternative dispute 
resolution method would excuse the breach that created the dispute." Id. at 874. 
Miller disputes that it failed to properly comply the subject dispute resolution 
provision but even if it initially did, it would not be precluded from seeking redress for 
Hajizadeh's undisputed breach of the REPC by making an offer of mediation and, 
thereafter, filing a complaint. Thus, Hajizadeh's contention that Millers' Complaint 
should be dismissed "with prejudice" because Miller failed to properly comply with the 
dispute resolution provisions of Section 15 was properly rejected by the trial court, and 
Miller is entitled to have his case heard on the merits. 
Similar to the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Ison, a number of other courts 
have also held that that the purported failure to properly comply with a mediation clause 
does not result in the action being dismissed "with prejudice." See, e.g., Quick Print of 
New Orleans, Inc. v. Danka Office Imaging, 2004 WL 1488656 (E.D. La.) (The court 
(citing Texaco Exploration and Production Co. v. AmClyde Engineered Products Co., 
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Inc., 243 F.3 906, 908 (5th Cir. 2001)) stayed the suit pending mediation, but did not 
dismiss the action); Haertt Wolff Parker, Inc. v. Howards. Wright Const. Co., 1989 WL 
151765 (D.Or.) (finding that when a party files a complaint without first attempting 
mediation (as required by the agreement), the court has the power to either stay the suit 
pending mediation, or to "dismiss the . . . claim with leave to refile without prejudice if 
the disputes are not resolved after referral to [the Mediator]."); Willis Corroon Corp. of 
Utah Inc. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 1998 WL 30069 (N.D. Cal.) (wherein the party 
filed a court action one day too early (as the agreement between the parties required the 
party to wait until 30 days had expired after mediation), the court dismissed the action 
"without prejudice" to its refiling on the merits of the dispute stating "Dismissal without 
prejudice of a premature action gives force to the binding agreement, and does not alter 
the parties' ultimate right to recover."); Eastbrook v. Piper Jaffray Companies, 492 F. 
Supp 2d 922 (N.D. Illinois 2007) (which held that where the issues are all subject to 
alternative dispute resolution, "the preferable course is dismissal without prejudice."). In 
the face of the foregoing case law (including the controlling Utah precedent of Isori), 
Hajizadeh has failed to cite a single case granting a dismissal with prejudice for failing to 
properly comply with an alternative dispute resolution clause. 
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In any event, Hajizadeh's ability to litigate the claim on the merits has not been 
prejudiced in any way.2 Further, when Miller offered mediation in writing, Hajizadeh 
declined.3 In addition, mediation would not result in any kind of binding decision on the 
merits because mediation is merely a supervised negotiation. Thus, the trial court 
properly ruled that Miller was entitled to have its claim heard on the merits and that the 
Complaint should be dismissed "without prejudice." 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's ruling that 
the Complaint was dismissed "without prejudice." 
DATED this T d a y of September, 2008. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Larry G. Moore 
Brent D. Wride 
Gregory S. Roberts 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
In fact, since Hajizadeh's counsel gave notice on April 30, 2007 that his client intended 
to default on the REPC, it was just as much the obligation of Hajizadeh's counsel under 
the REPC to request mediation of his breach, as it was the Miller's. (See REPC at § 15, 
which states: "Mediation shall take place within 30 days after notice by either party of 
the existence of a claim." (Emphasis added.).) 
3
 Consequently, Hajizadeh legally "waived " mediation within the meaning of the REPC 
as such states: " . . . the parties may agree in writing to waive mediation." (See REPC at 
§15.) 
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